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Man as the Measure of All Things
Thoughts on Moral Perfection, Finitude, and Metaethics
Jeremy Millington
1 W. H. Auden stated that “the only sensible procedure for a critic is to keep silent about
works which he believes to be bad, while at the same time vigorously campaigning for
those  which  he  believes  to  be  good,  especially  if  they  are  being  neglected  or
underestimated by the public.”1 Following a similar metacritical theme, he goes on to
remark that the way to educate a man about his poor eating habits is not to tell him his
diet is poor, but to provide him with a healthier alternative. Such metacritical advice
moves against  the grain of  some contemporary philosophic practice,  which seems to
revolve around philosophic meals starting to grow rot.
2 The metaethical field, in particular, can feel something like this. Its original purpose, so
far as I can tell, was to produce a systematic understanding of what goes on in ethical
theory  such  that  ethics  might  produce  fruit.  I  have  in  mind  here  something  like
G. E. Moore’s  science  of  ethics  found  in  the  Principia  Ethica:  the  place  a  number  of
contemporary ethical readers begin.2 Perhaps, however, this is already claiming too much
for metaethics as it now stands; perhaps its goal is more distantly connected to ethical
practice and moral issues. But should such a distancing between practice, theory, and
meta-theory cause concern? On the one hand, the narrowness of metaethical work aims
to produce a genuine philosophic understanding without conflating its subject or method
with that of ethical theory and practice. On the other hand, whether or not we have
theories to justify or illuminate such practices, they carry on nonetheless. That is, the
exercise of moral and ethical practice imposes itself upon life, in the way that hunger
does. Has metaethics fed our moral-theoretical hunger?
3 I  am sympathetic to Auden’s critical methodology, but there is a certain professional
responsibility  that  demands  addressing  current  trends  in  ethical  debate  (i.e.  the
metaethical debate), as well as their genealogy. I am inclined at once to participate in this
exchange  of  criticism  encompassed  by  the  metaethical  narrative  and  to  abandon  it
altogether for alternative pictures. Given this tension, I propose a sort of conversation
that brings into the fold some notions borrowed from the debate in metaethics along with
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those outside it – some contemporary and some classical, some philosophic and some
poetic.
4 Admittedly,  such a conversation will  feel foreign to the analytic-argumentative styles
found in (at least) some metaethical debate. It will have its own inherent limitations, as
well:  a  certain  informality  and a  long  line  of  contingent  propositions,  in  particular.
However, I  hope such a strategy will  provide a framework for identifying some weak
genes in the metaethical lineage, while simultaneously offering a more diverse, and thus
a healthier, partner for the moral theorizing.
5 The  structure  of  the  discussion  will  follow  these  very  broad  lines,  starting  with
Protagoras’ notion of man as the measure of all things: If man is the measure of all things,
we must consider what man is. Amongst other things, man is flux in a finite world, which
means that he3 changes as a measuring stick (evolves, if you like). If man is the measure of
all things, including moral questions, which picture can we use to orient ourselves? One
intuition is that developing a moral practice in light of man’s shifting horizon demands a
similar flexibility,  one that adapts.  What are the conditions and criteria for adjusting
practice then? My suggestion is  that moral  perfection,  which is  what adjustments to
practice seek to accommodate, comes from exemplary figures, to the degree to which
such figures embody an ideal,  fixed standard without transcending so far beyond the
reality of a finite, evolving existence as to alienate man from himself. Moral perfection
bears what may be called a family resemblance to Cavell’s notion of moral perfectionism,
which itself  grows out  of  an Emersonian picture – an unattained but  attainable self.
Aristotle is, likewise, perhaps a family member a couple steps removed, but certainly part
of the lineage. But, like all family resemblances, there are important differences.
6 At least initially, this line of thought bears only a loose connection to the metaethical
debate. The fundamental difference here is between the question of moral properties,
which dominates metaethics in many ways, and that of moral character. The two relate in
important ways: neglecting one at the expense of the other would diminish the project as
a whole and on either side of the divide.
 
A Foot
7 If it is true, as Protagoras seems to have claimed, that man is the measure of all things, we
might ask, how does one use such a measuring tool? All measurements depend upon a
relation, a stretch of space from beginning to end, from lowest to highest, and from one
to another. As we survey man as measure, we consider all things, but we also consider the
measuring stick itself. What sort of measuring stick is man? As a ruler, it may be useful to
consider the history of the instrument – a Ruler – as a sort of analogous narrative. It is in-
structive, however mythical, to consider the notion of a foot, in particular, as the most
basic measuring tool. The foot is that point at which the human makes firm contact with
the world. We might even mythologize such a development further along evolutionary
lines, by which the rise of bipedal man eliminated the unity (or conflict?) between hand
and foot,  leaving  only  the  latter  as  the  surest  useful  measure  of  earthly  space.  The
distance  from be-  ginning to  end thus  becomes  the  distance  from heel  to  toe.  As  a
standard of measurement, its objectivity fluctuates in accordance with that of the ruler –
the imperial footprint, as one legend suggests. Such a scale may strike us as irrational
elitism, but its principle remains: man, as an embodied measure, reveals no consistent,
uniformly objective standard – he has many sized feet.
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8 If  man embodies  no easy,  fixed and reliable  rule  by which to measure all  things,  to
measure  reality,  reality  will  appear  similarly  dynamic.  Locke  states,  “The  obvious
portions of Extension, that affect our Senses, carry with them into the Mind the Idea of
Finite.”4 The finite is a concept easily grasped and seen in the world, as it dominates our
experience. It is also perhaps unsurprising that we should seek to tame and order such a
world:  conceptually,  scientifically,  politically,  militaristically,  philosophically,  and  so
forth.  The world becomes an ultimately  threatening place to  inhabit.  Its  beauty and
mystery are admirable and aweinspiring but poised for consumption, for remission into
the individual – beauty leaves the world and retreats into the eye of the beholder. The
world must be possessed and dominated in some way. The move towards concreteness
becomes literally and figuratively real – the garden of Eden is paved over. If we cannot
provide some fixed standard, perhaps reality and nature can do the job for us (e.g. the
laws of nature, via physics, Romanticism, Thoreau). We can then graft ourselves onto this
permanence – live lives free of change, free of risk, free of mystery.
9 So many projects rest upon this tension between the fixed and the unfixed (objectivity
and subjectivity,  transcendence and immanence,  infinitude and finitude).  The tension
between the two is a major thread of Hegel’s unfolding of the concept of Spirit, as well as
Kant’s understanding of God, reason and faith. Reconciling such tensions is certainly a
philosophical project, if not a moral and religious one, too.
10 There is more to be explored in man as the measure of all things, room to inject some
further  qualifications.  What  could  this  look  like?  If  we  survey  the  great  historical
immensity that constitutes man, we come away with a frameless picture: contradictory,
confusing, and complex in a variety of ways. It resembles something like a monumental
Rothko painting with its foggy fields of color. The closer I stand to such a picture, the
more in touch I am with its physical presence, its rich texture, its concrete reality. A stage
of determinable but indeterminate action presents itself. Paradoxically, the closer I get,
the more I distance myself from its boundaries, from the possibility of measurement, of a
certain kind of understanding. Man, or as he should be called (in line with the maxim as
originally written), humanity, presents a similar puzzle – of distance and measurement,
of  subjectivity  and  finitude. Humanity’s  history  demonstrates  both  tremendous
destructive and violent possibilities and acts of exceptional love and empathy, as well as
complex  moments  that  seem to  question  such a  distinction  altogether.  If  we  are  to
measure all things – humanity included – by such a standard, what picture of humanity
are we to work with? It would seem naïve at best and dangerous at worst to exclude some
picture or another, however extreme. I am suggesting, ultimately, one take into account
both the foot of the king and the sole of the people.
 
Some Questions of Finitude
11 Before considering how moral questions relate to finite, fluctuating existence, it will be of
some use to consider the notion of finitude more generally. What does it mean to say that
human beings and the world they occupy is a finite one? Is it a finite world? And if it is,
what role does infinity play, if any?
12 Zeno’s  dichotomy  paradox  describes  a  story  along  the  following  lines  according  to
Aristotle’s account. Imagine that a hundred yards away, there is a bus you must catch.
Being a fast runner, you catch the bus just in time. It seems clear enough that in the act of
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catching the bus, you passed a halfway point between the starting point and the bus.
Between that halfway point and your starting position, we can imagine another halfway
point – a quarter of the full distance. Between the quarter distance and your start point
lies another halfway point. If we carry this process out, halving each half, there seems to
be a potentially infinite number of halfway points between your starting position and the
bus. This suggests that you crossed an infinite distance in order to reach the bus since the
number of half way points can be measured indefinitely. How can one cross an infinite
amount of measurable space? One can no more count to infinity than traverse such a
distance. To count, to measure, is to posit a finitude.
13 There are a variety of solutions and conclusions one can draw from this illustration. Zeno
suggests that motion is an illusion – we never actually move anywhere or traverse any
distance. Conversely, the illustration might suggest that the world, the material world at
least,  is  not  an  ideal  realm,  in  the  way  that  numbers  are.  So  long  as  the  world  is
measurable, it is finite. The ideal, the perfect, the infinite, belongs to another realm.
14 Locke covers similar territory in contrasting a “positive” versus a “negative” idea of the
infinite:
We can, I think, have no positive Idea of any Space or Duration, which is not made
up of, and commensurate to repeated Numbers of Feet or Yards, or Days and Years.
And therefore, since an Idea of infinite Space or Duration must needs be made up of
infinite Parts, it can have no other Infinity, than that of Number capable of still
farther Addition; but not an actual positive Idea of a Number infinite. For, I think, it
is  evident,  that  the  Addition  of  finite  things  together  […]  can  never  otherwise
produce the Idea infinite […].5
15 Locke  thus  demonstrates  the  discrepancy  between  “extensions”  of  actual  infinite
duration and those merely moving toward it,  the latter being only a negative idea of
infinity. Returning to the bus illustration, imagine measuring the distance covered in
order to compare your speed to others’. The distance measures out to a number of stick
lengths  –  12.5  sticks.  Does  ‘12.5’  describe  the  distance  ideally,  or  “positively”  in  the
Lockean sense? If it were exactly 12.5 sticks, then the same problem as before emerges.
Within ‘12.5’, there are an infinite number of halves, which must be measured.
16 The numbers that such measurements rely upon are descriptive of the distance but not
perfectly equivalent. Zeno’s paradox points to a discrepancy between those numbers and
the physical reality to which they point. Numbers, used in this way, work as a sort of
theoretical model, an approximation. Does this cease to make them useful? Measuring the
distance at 12.5 sticks allows for comparisons, such as the amount of time it takes one to
run  12.5  sticks  under  various  conditions.  The  numerical  values  provide  a  certain
framework for understanding. They are approximations of a physical reality.
17 William James made an analogous observation early in his development of pragmatism.
He stated that “as the sciences have developed farther, the notion has gained ground that
most, perhaps all, of our laws are only approximations.”6 Furthermore, we might say that
some approximations are better than others.
18 Numbers, like other theoretical tools, are useful in a sort of reverse sense as well. Rather
than merely corresponding descriptively to some physical phenomenon, they help reveal
possibilities  (e.g.  practical,  technological,  etc.).  In  sports,  athletes  and  coaches,  use
measurements to assess the success of training programs. By measuring the time it takes
a player to run some particular distance down to a tenth of a second, a coach will know if
that player is capable of racing past the opposition.
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19 However, there is a point at which the exactness of distinctions ceases to have value. It is
possible to measure a sprint down to the trillionth of a second. But in the context of a
game, it is in the tenths of a second that significant differences occur. This is not an
inherent feature of sprint times. It is contingent upon the structure of the game and the
ways in which players play it. It could be otherwise, depending on the game.
20 Physics  provides  a  number  of  examples  in  which  such  long  and  incomprehensible
measurements do matter. They mark the difference between life on Earth and no Earth at
all. The Earth must be a particular distance from the sun and be of a particular mass in
relation to the sun, such that the atmosphere will produce and hold oxygen and gravity
will be not too strong or too weak. It must be a sufficiently safe distance from other
planets. It must have a makeup of particular atmospheric gases and surface rock. All of
these measurements,  some argue,  come down to degrees  of  incredible  precision and
interconnection.
21 To measure is to fall short, for there is always a higher number. A challenge of ethical
theory, as such, is to account for the discrepancy between the finite and the infinite.
Stanley  Cavell  describes  this  discrepancy,  between  “the  world  of  sense”  and  the
intelligible world, as a “disappointment with the world.”7 In cases of law, or “ultimate
perfection,”8 the standard becomes incommensurable. Embracing approximations seems
equally unsatisfying,  however.  So either the standard – the law – transcends too far
beyond the reality of finite being or it remains finite and ephemeral. The task becomes
the discovery of useful measuring tools and an appropriate standard of perfection that
reconciles the two in some sensible fashion.
 
Methods for Morals and Objectivity
“The difference between verse and prose is self-evident, but it is a sheer waste of
time to look for a definition of the difference between poetry and prose.”9
22 In the above quotation, I take Auden to be expressing what G. E. Moore expresses in the
debate over the definability of ‘good’. Moore argues that good is not definable, though we
can know what it is.10 The mistake that philosophers have made up to the time of his
writing, Moore says, is that they mistake ‘good’ for some other, natural property, like
pleasure.
23 If  systematic,  philosophical ethics stands any chance, pleasure must be allowed to be
pleasure, and ‘good’ good. In response, critics ask, how do we know that the words we use
distinctly for ‘good’ and ‘pleasure’  are not actually referring to the same thing, be it
natural or non-natural? How do we determine the difference without either assuming it
or denying it from the beginning?
24 Moore’s  essay  sparked  a  series  of  papers  concerned  with  moral  properties  and
definability. Consequently, some of the debate in metaethical theory focuses on the moral
realm as a sort of quasi-naturalized science (or fully naturalized in some cases),11 in which
the philosopher qua scientist looks for moral properties, either literally in the physical
world or as non-natural properties, floating about the metaphysical realm waiting for
minds to apprehend them.12 Essentially two sides emerge from this debate, one motivated
by attempts to show that morality is fixed (imposed from without), the other motivated
by attempts to show that morality is relative, the product of preference or whim (created
from within) – and never the twain shall meet.13
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25 The first side in the moral properties debate tries to proclaim objectivity and the latter
subjectivity.  These  terms  carry  a  lot  of  baggage.  They  have  (at  least)  two  possible
meanings. In the first sense, objectivity and subjectivity are contrasted in terms of truth.
Something is true objectively if it is true independent of human thought and experience.
It is objectively true, for example, that General Sherman, a giant sequoia in California’s
Sequoia  National  Park,  is  the  largest  tree  in  the  world.  In  contrast,  something  is
subjective if it is contingent upon a subject. The experience of color is thought to be
subjective (though the subjective experience itself can then be objectified; the experience
is the object in that case, not the actual color). Subjectivity may be called relative in that
the  correct  answer  to  a  question  is  thought  to  be  relative  to  individual  subjects;
correspondingly, objectivity may be called universal. So if you want to prepare the best
meal for a world leader (president, prime minister, etc.), there is no flatly universal, ‘best’
meal; the best meal is relative to the individual leader.
26 The question of what is true independent of human thought and experience presents some
complications.  Contingency  commonly  allies  itself  with  subjectivity.  If  something  is
thought to be dependent on certain conditions, then it is not universal in an absolute
sense.  In  moral  questions,  such an alliance  poses  a  great  deal  of  confusion.  Because
something could be different says nothing about whether or not it is. Objectivity, in the
sense just out- lined, need not necessarily feel threatened by contingency.
27 The second sense in which objectivity and subjectivity occur is closely related though
perhaps more slippery.  If  something is  objective in this  sense,  it  has  a  real,  material 
presence – something that is potentially accessible to independent subjects under certain
pre-conditions  (e.g.  functioning sensory organs).  Moral  realists  typically  fall  into the
category  of  moral  objectivists,  though  the  manner  in  which  moral  properties  exist
objectively varies from one realist to the next. Moore is a realist, and thus objective about
moral properties, though not in the material sense. Others adopt a quasi-realist stance,
though this ultimately proves to fall flat on the real issues at stake.
28 Which  things  are  genuinely  subjective  and  which  things  are genuinely  objective  is
difficult to parse out, and often at the heart of the ethical and metaethical debate: are
moral properties objective or subjective, universal, absolute or relative? Perhaps this is
not an either/or question, though. An illustration about flowers may demonstrate some
of the complexities involved, while hopefully unloading some of the baggage that comes
with specifically moral questions.
29 How much is ‘a lot’? If I need a lot of flowers, is it clear how many flowers I am looking
for? Is ‘a lot’  objective or subjective? Imagine a series of circumstances in which you
request ‘a lot’ of flowers. In the first case, you are planning a wedding with a thousand
guests. The ceremony will take place in a monumental and sparsely decorated space. In
the second case, you made some unfortunate comment that insulted a dear friend, and
you would like to make amends. In the third and final case, you are a botanist looking to
discover some particular feature that distinguishes the Mexican poppy flower from the
California poppy flower. What counts as ‘a lot’? Is it the same in each case? The first case
seems to demand more than second case clearly enough. Though, we can imagine more
specific circumstances that could threaten that assumption, too. If the offended friend
was a figure of some tremendous sensitivity and, furthermore, particularly immune to
gestures of apology that demand little investment of time and money, then only the most
extravagant effort would truly make amends. In conjunction, if the bride and groom in
the first scenario lived lives of urban isolation, having made few if any trips to the florally
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rich countryside, ‘a lot’ might mean something different. Does this mean that just any
amount meets the standard for ‘a lot’? Or that ‘a lot’ is not objective in some way? Yes and
no. In terms of ‘a lot’ counting as objective in some strict, material sense, that seems to
have little promise: what counts as ‘a lot’ is relative to particular situations. Similarly, it is
contingent upon specific details.
30 Does contingency rule out objectivity in the softer sense? In each of these scenarios, there
is a sense in which ‘a lot’ is contingent upon some greater purpose and set of details. Not
every detail matters but some do, which must be worked out in individual cases. For the
botanist,  as for  the  wedding  planner  and  offending  friend,  there  will  be  particular
amounts of flowers that will not sufficiently qualify as ‘a lot.’ One will not be enough and
two likely will not suffice either. If we try to reduce the amount that counts as ‘a lot’ to
some rigid material quantity (i.e. ‘a thousand’), we lose the point. For the botanist, one
flower  will  not  suffice,  but  it  is  not  clear  that  fifty  or  fifty-one  will  generate  much
discrepancy (both are closer to a lot than one). Will six, fifteen, or twenty-seven count?
We can recognize the difference in extremes possibly, but measuring the precise moment
where a quantity changes to ‘a lot’ is difficult to pin down without some further set of
qualifications.
31 Objectivity seems to be threatened here. But imagine a further situation. What if I show
the botanist the case of the offending friend and the wedding planner and say: “Look, a
lot of different quantities can count as ‘a lot,’ so any amount I give you could count as ‘a
lot.’  Take  these  three  flowers  and  be  on  your  way.”  The  botanist  may  walk  away
perplexed and offended, possibly eliciting another complicated situation demanding the
assessment of ‘a lot’ – a lot of explaining and apologizing. In the given situation, a lot of
flowers  meant  something quite  specific  and certainly  concrete:  not  just  any number
would do.
32 When thinking about moral objectivity and subjectivity, I suggest we follow similar lines,
a line of thought that, not coincidently, also appears in Emerson. He states:
There is a man and his virtues. Men do what is called a good action, as some piece of
courage  or  charity,  much  as  they  would  pay  a  fine  in  expiation  of  daily  non-
appearance on parade. Their works are done as an apology or extenuation of their
living in the world, – as invalids and the insane pay a high board. Their virtues are
penances.14
33 This passage follows another passage in which Emerson states that “good and bad are but
names very readily transferable to that or this.”15 On the surface, such a proclamation
may seem to suggest that ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are not objective in either sense outlined. Good
and bad fluidly and arbitrarily fix and unfasten themselves. However, comparing these
two  passages  together  with  a  later  one  clarifies  his  position  in  line  with  a  softer
objectivity.  He  states:  “Character  teaches  above  our  wills.  Men  imagine  that  they
communicate their virtue or vice only by overt actions, and do not see that virtue or vice
emit a breath every moment.”16 Character manifests good and bad, it places it in the
world. So what counts as moral cannot rigidly or blindly be reduced to some material
action or property. Hume, a paragon of the empiricist model, provides valuable insight
here. In moral matters, he states: “The external performance has no merit. We must look
within  to  find  the  moral  quality.  This  we  cannot  do directly;  and  therefore  fix  our
attention on actions, as on external signs. But these actions are still considered as signs.”
17
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34 One of the gaps in Moore’s theory, and subsequent papers responding both positively and
critically to his position, is the ability to generate some method for identifying moral
properties. Moore suggests bringing ‘good’ before the mind. An admirable suggestion, I
think, but limited in its ability to generate the sort of systematic understanding of ethical
practice he envisioned. And presumably the goal of this would be to aid theories of ethical
practice so that decisions warranting ethical deliberation could be subject to some kind of
test: does this object, act, thing, etc., possess the property of goodness, thus conferring
moral worth? If the metaethical debate rests on the identification of moral properties –
their real, emotive, natural or non-natural existence – but fails to generate a method for
identification, perhaps alternative strategies offer something more substantive. It is, after
all, not the cataloging of specific quantities of flowers that constitute ‘a lot’ in various
cases that tells me how much ‘a lot’ will be in future cases.
 
Questions of Perfection
Though a work of literature can be read in a number of ways, this number is finite
and can be arranged in a hierarchical order; some readings are obviously “truer”
than others, some doubtful, some obviously false, and some, like reading a novel
backwards, absurd.18
35 It will help to recount the course of the discussion thus far to see how the pieces fit
together. First, we take the premise that human beings are the measure of all things,
which means that ethical questions ought to be considered in light of what humans are
(and how they change). Second, humans are, amongst other things, finite beings in a
finite world, which means they are not a fixed, complete thing. A shortcoming of much
metaethical debate stems from its emphasis upon objectivity and subjectivity in terms of
moral properties. Such an emphasis on moral properties leaves out the human element,
failing to generate methods that inform practice. Part of that failure, I contend, arises
from neglecting how a finite being operates in relation to ideals, which are of a different,
perfect nature. Rather than searching for moral properties outside human being (in the
infinite), or dismissing them altogether (reducing them to the finite), perhaps we can
look for models that reconcile the two. I  further suggest that such a model is better
conceived in terms of character rather than properties: exemplars of moral character can
generate a practice that accommodates fluctuations in experience and human being as
they take on evolving shapes.
36 In Cities of Words, Cavell explores the idea of moral perfectionism, tracing its appearance
and  evolution  through  Emerson,  Plato,  and  American  film,  amongst  other  strange
bedfellows.  The  idea  of  moral  perfectionism,  he  claims,  begins  with  a  sense  of
disappointment about the world, a difference between the world “I converse with” and
the world I think, in Emerson’s words.19 He then poses the following question: “But if the
world is disappointing and the world is malleable and hence we fell ourselves called upon
for  change,  where  does  change begin,  with the  individual  (with myself)  or  with the
collection of those who make up my (social, political) world?”20 This represents a subtle
shift toward questions of moral character and away from questions of moral properties. I
have suggested that questions of moral properties are embedded in a moral discourse
that emphasizes a sort of quasi-scientific or empirical search for properties in particular
actions and objects, while the former demands an acknowledgement of what generates
their  appearance  in  actions  and  objects.  Interestingly,  the  moral-property  discourse
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develops out of a practice tangentially connected to discourse, while the latter, as Cavell
notes, makes discourse the cornerstone. When Cavell begins to discuss The Philadelphia
Story (Cukor 1939), he observes:
I said of moral perfectionism […] that the issues it assesses are typically not front-
page news, not, for example, issues like abortion, euthanasia, capital punishments,
whistle-blowing, plagiarism, informing, bribery, greed, scapegoat, torture, treason,
rape,  spousal  abuse,  child  neglect,  genital  mutilation,  and so  on.  But  not  every
fateful  moral  choice,  every judgment of  good and bad or right  and wrong,  is  a
matter for public debate.21
37 His suggestion is that such issues become moral issues as they develop out of the lives of
people. The public/private divide has an obvious correlate in the sense of media coverage
(in the context of the film), but it also conceptually corresponds with a divide between
the  ideal  world  and one  that  is  manifest  in  the  finite  world:  what  gets  worked out
internally,  within  the  realm  of  character,  comes  out  into  the  world  embodied  and
measured.  This is  not to say that the actions that spring forth out of  character,  like
abortion, euthanasia, etc., do not come to possess either objective or subjective moral
properties in the end, but such questions are secondary to the primary question of what
sort of person one wishes to be, that one is capable of being.
38 Cavell claims that the Kantian project attempts to manage this divide between a sensuous
world (the finite, the imminent), in which we are bound, and the intelligible world (the
infinite, the transcendent), in which we are free.22 The failure of Kant, according to Cavell,
is to make the intelligible world an overbearing task master that asks me to abandon or
ignore the sensuous world, which he identifies with inclination. It creates a standard of
action beyond what the measured, finite self is capable of achieving.
39 Earlier in the book, Cavell suggests that Emersonian perfectionism “specifically sets itself
against any idea of ultimate perfection.”23 He goes on to state further, “To live a moral life
should  not  require  that  we  become  Socrateses  or  Buddhas  or  Christs,  all  but
unprovokable.”24 This  is  itself  too  harsh,  however.  It  denies  each  of  these  figures  a
dynamic reality – a humanity – and signals a departure too far in the opposite direction.
He is  right to absolve us of  the demand for some ultimate perfection,  but only with
certain qualifications not offered in his reading. If Kant’s position is too heavily rooted in
the  external,  the  public,  and  what  the  transcendent  (the  infinite)  demands, Cavell’s
position is perhaps overly rooted in the internal, the private, and what the subjective (the
individual, the finite) demands.
40 Bridging the divide between Kant’s position and Cavell’s,  Stephen Mulhall points to a
profoundly important development in the transcendent conception of God after Kant. In
putting God “in his place” – that is, removed from the finite world – a genuine frame of
reference for human character is  eliminated.25 Nietzsche and Kierkegaard inherit  the
consequences  of  this  divide.  Mulhall  points  out,  “What  is  at  stake  is  a  matter  of
orientation,  of  the acknowledgement or denial  of  a frame of  reference or horizon of
significance capable of informing the course of a human life.”26
41 Following the lead of Kant, and perhaps more significantly, Hegel,  we might take the
figure of Christ as an exemplar for the concept of ethical character established thus far,
conceptually and practically. I leave open the possibility of alternative exemplars of a
similar character, however. The example of Christ, as such, will be just that, an example.
42 Picking up this thread, Mulhall draws us back to a reconciled image of Christ that makes
moral  perfection not  an impossibly  abstract,  transcendent  law,  either  imposed upon
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humanity or  far  removed from it,  but  a  means for  correcting and developing moral
character. He states:
Christ is the presentation of the infinite in the finite; he is not a finite messenger or
natural  proxy  for  an  essentially  transcendent  Being,  but  rather  transcendence
incarnate. The fact of his existence tells us that God’s transcendence is such that it
is not only able but willing – even that it deeply desires – fully to inhabit finitude.
And this  utterly  changes  our  sense  of  what  transcendence (hence  finitude,  and
hence moral existence) might be.27
43 What this further suggests is that the finite nature of Christ is essential to making the
reality of his character attainable for human being.
44 One of the problems of metaethics I belabored early in this paper is its failure to generate
reasonable guidelines for ethical practice, or even an understanding of it. In one of the
prominent threads in metaethics,  Richard T. Garner outlines J. L.  Mackie’s position in
initiating his own conversation about ethics, “[Mackie] described a ‘second order moral
view’ as a ‘view about the status of moral values and the nature of moral valuing, about
where and how they fit  into  the  world’”  (my emphasis).28 The orientation with which
Garner starts his paper already frames the moral picture in favor of a view that makes the
grounding of moral questions dependent upon the discovery of moral properties in the
world. The philosophic dialogue then proceeds along somewhat expected lines in which
some fail to find moral values (or properties) while others do. The disconnect between
this particular philosophic horizon and ethical practice may seem surprising at first, but
it is less so in light of the prescribed narrative, which, we might say, focuses on falling
apples instead of gravity.
45 The model of Christ is one I think needs some recovering, such that we are no longer
focused just on the laws of gravity or the apples it fells. We are inclined to imagine, as we
do  with  most  saintly  figures  –  the  Socrateses,  Buddhas,  and  Christs  –  that  their
achievement says nothing as to what is possible for human beings generally.
 
Answerable Questions
46 It might be of some use to consider what it is that moral questions ask of us, and how we
might go about answering the call  of  morality.  That is,  more generally,  what sort of
questions are genuinely answerable? Some questions in mathematics, for example, seem
solvable  under  certain  conditions  that  we  can  intelligibly  articulate.  Some  other
questions seem solvable or answerable though perhaps with less obvious rigor. This range
of questions may vary from more complicated math problems to, say, solving a crime, like
‘who stole the baker’s truck?’ The methods for solving both have been developed through
particular social and cultural histories. These methods for answering questions develop
out of a tradition and a practice. How do these practices develop? What faculties do we
make use of in accommodating alterations in our methods? Such changes are, firstly,
motivated by the goal in question (e.g. to solve the equation or crime). If a practice or
method fails  to  generate the actual  culprit  of  a  crime or  at  least  a  line-up of  likely
suspects, we adjust the method. Such an adjustment requires an understanding of what
good answers look like and that some grounds are available for re-orienting our method
to produce such answers.  If  we deny the ability to sense the ground, there is no use
speculating about its location or features. Of course, it does not seem clear that one can
deny such an ability without appealing to one. What we come to discover in, say, science
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is indeed of a different character in some important way from what we might come across
in moral  deliberation.  That  we are  using fundamentally  different  mental  faculties  in
science  and  ethical  question  answering  is  not  clear:  reason,  rationality,  experience,
memory, intuition, observation, thought, etc.
47 The same reasons offered for discounting the conditions for moral knowledge are equally
incriminating toward empirical-sense experience. That questions of science have become
answerable  in  productive  ways  says  nothing of  the  relatively  recent  development  of
particular practices, and even less of the degree to which such knowledge generating
systems  are  limited  and  likely  subject  to  substantial  future  correction.  Our
approximations  will  change  and,  preferably,  improve.  Small  gains,  which  current
scientific practices achieve, will only come to seem smaller and more limited, or partial,
as the practice grows and adjusts in accordance with the questions it fails to answer,
which are infinitely more abundant than the range of questions seemingly answered.
48 Moral questions proceed along somewhat analogous lines, I believe. The development of
character  is  something  that  demands  a  perpetual  process  of  education  from  one
generation to the next. Or, as Cavell notes in Pursuits of Happiness, from one individual to
the  next.29 We  are  all  in  need  of  conversational  partners  that  educate  us.  Dewey
demonstrates something along these lines in terms of the very survival and continuation
of a society. All communities and the individuals that constitute them rely upon a set of
practices that a community (family, state, tribe, church) must share.30 Answering moral
questions in terms of specific acts is something like trying to achieve complete scientific
knowledge outside of a practice that offers grounds for correcting the practice which
generates such knowledge in the first place. A good scientific practice is capable of going
about answering any questions within a certain range with a particular set of skills that
lead to promising answers. Ethical deliberations and related actions will not make sense
divorced from the ability to evaluate methods for answering moral questions.
49 If you adopt the knowledge of science and its system without understanding how that
system works – why it has developed along the lines it has, the spirit of that system – you
forfeit the ability to identify facts and features of reality in future cases. What I think
exemplary human characters offer us in the development of ethical theory is a grounding
for what is possible for guiding practice, as well as a picture of the relation between the
world of the infinite, which is indeed free, and that of the finite, which is measurable and
bounded.  Subsequently,  metaethical  theory  may benefit  from a  slightly  more  liberal
pragmatic approach. Pragmatic in the sense of identifying the reality of human being and
the need to accommodate fluctuations in experience.
50 Moral practice in the sense outlined here is not some special activity engaged in from
time to time, but it is what orients our lives as a whole, even in the moments when we
engage in activities of a different nature: creative, political, philosophic, or otherwise.
Echoing  Emerson  again,  we  must  see  “that  the  virtue  or  vice  emit  a  breath  every
moment.”31
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What  is  the  purpose  of  metaethics  in  relation  to  ethical  theory  and  ethical  practice  in
contemporary philosophical practice? Metaethics is preoccupied with (at least) three particularly
fundamental concepts: (1) moral properties, (2) systematization (in Moore’s sense, but also in the
sense of law), and (3) the finite – this latter concept may only be evident incidentally but is fatally
neglected.  What  is  needed  for  a  rounder  philosophical  picture  is  an  account  of  three
complementary concepts: (1) moral character, (2) the spirit of law, and (3) the infinite. Streams of
thought  are  emerging from neglected traditions,  particularly  those  of  pragmatism and early
American  transcendentalism,  that  offer  a  means  for  reconciling  these  two  sides.  This  paper
brings together elements of these traditions in a sort of initiatory conversation, one that takes
seriously the need for an integrated conceptual framework. This process of reconciliation allows
for a liberal narrative that begins with Protagoras’ notion of man as the measure of all things and
ends with a quasi-Cavellian notion of moral perfection.
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